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Introduction
When people talk about the ‘abortion question’, what 
they generally mean is something like this: how should we 
balance the protection of unborn human life against the 
rights and interests of a pregnant woman to control her own 
body? Possibly, they also have in mind a further important 
(but analytically distinct) issue: how should law (criminal or 
otherwise) be deployed to enforce the answer given to the 
first question?
These are important moral and – for some – theological 
questions. However, this book does not engage directly with 
either of them. Rather, it aims to clear the waters, allowing 
them to be discussed in a way that is unmuddied by myths and 
misconceptions regarding matters of fact. In a debate where 
seemingly even the most basic empirical claims are disputed, 
the book offers a clear and succinct account of the relevant 
evidence. Where does public opinion stand with regard to the 
permissibility of abortion? What would be the likely impact 
of decriminalisation on women’s health? Would it remove 
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the improvement of services, or would it rather amount to 
dangerous deregulation, removing essential safeguards against 
harmful practice? Would unqualified backstreet providers be 
left at liberty to offer unsafe services? Would it remain possible 
to punish those who cause women to lose wanted pregnancies 
through vicious assaults? And what lessons can we learn from 
the experience of other countries regarding the role played 
by criminal prohibitions on abortion and the likely impact of 
their removal?
While different people hold profoundly diverging views 
regarding the morality of abortion, the answers to these kinds 
of questions should not be a matter of moral disagreement. 
Rather, each can be answered through reference to robust 
clinical trials, well conducted observational studies, detailed 
consideration of demographic data, rigorous opinion polls, 
and careful analysis of relevant law. In the chapters to follow, 
the authors take on this work. They navigate a field in which 
high quality peer- reviewed studies, the findings of expert 
committees and data obtained from rigorous, representative 
opinion polls rub shoulders with ideologically driven pseudo- 
science, misleading lobbying literature, unsubstantiated media 
reports, personal anecdotes, and opinion data generated by 
‘push- polling’. All too frequently in public debate, claims that 
cite these various sources are wrongly offered up as if they 
have equivalent weight. Here, the authors sift and evaluate the 
evidence to offer a robust response to each of the questions 
discussed earlier, relying on the best available evidence. The aim 
is to ensure that readers are fully informed on these important 
questions of fact before they reach their own view on the moral 
issues at the heart of the abortion debate.
This introductory chapter begins by briefly explaining what 
is meant by the ‘decriminalisation’ of abortion, before outlining 
the relevant current law. It then moves on to offer an overview 
of trends in the incidence of abortion in the UK and how these 
have been shaped by broad demographic factors and sexual 
and reproductive health policy. Finally, the chapter considers 
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how reform might come about and what form it might take, 
before briefly introducing the five chapters to follow.
What do we mean by ‘decriminalisation’ of abortion?
In July 2019, Time magazine was forced to revise the headline 
that it had given to an earlier article, which had wrongly 
claimed that the Abortion Act 1967 had decriminalised 
abortion in England, Wales and Scotland (Haynes, 2019). The 
author of the original headline can, perhaps, be forgiven: he 
or she was far from alone in holding this mistaken belief. In a 
recent poll conducted by ICM, 69 per cent of the 2,002 people 
surveyed believed that abortion was currently ‘completely legal 
if the woman requests it’, with only 13 per cent identifying 
the correct legal position: that abortion is a ‘criminal act unless 
certain strict conditions are met’ (ICM, 2017).
For the purposes of this book, ‘decriminalisation of abortion’ 
is understood to mean the removal of those specific prohibitions 
that render abortion a criminal act, punishing the intentional 
ending of a pregnancy either by a woman herself or by a third 
party. Decriminalisation of abortion can be either partial (for 
example, where criminal penalties are removed only within a 
prescribed time period, say the first 24 weeks of pregnancy) 
or full (where no specific criminal prohibitions are retained at 
any stage of pregnancy).
We should also be clear about what ‘decriminalisation’ 
does not mean. Notably, following decriminalisation, the 
performance of abortions would not be exempt from criminal 
law: as will be described in Chapter Four, general criminal 
offences that apply to all medical treatment would continue to 
apply to non- consensual or dangerously negligent procedures. 
Nor does decriminalisation necessarily mean that there should 
be no specific regulation of abortion, merely that any such 
specific regulation should not be backed by criminal sanction. 
For example, while reporting of female genital mutilation 
is now mandatory in the UK, failure to report attracts not 
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a criminal sanction but a disciplinary one, enforced by the 
relevant professional regulatory organisation, such as the 
General Medical Council (section 5B, Female Genital Mutilation 
Act 2003). Likewise, when the Australian state of Victoria 
decriminalised abortion, it laid down specific requirements 
that must be met in order for an abortion to be performed 
after 24 weeks but backed them with a professional sanction, 
rather than a criminal one (see Chapter Six).
Current law in the UK
What are the specific criminal prohibitions that punish the 
intentional ending of a pregnancy? These are to be found in a 
number of statutes and common law provisions, which together 
constitute the oldest extant statutory framework governing any 
specific medical procedure (Sheldon, 2016). The law differs 
in significant ways between England and Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland.
The Offences Against the Person Act (1861)
The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 applies in England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland. It is a product of mid- Victorian 
Britain:  in the memorable words of Sir James Munby, 
subsequently President of the Family Division of the High Court 
and a member of the Court of Appeal, it was passed at a time 
when ‘our society was only on the brink of the beginnings of 
the modern world’ (Smeaton 2002: para 332). While excluding 
the abortion provisions from its recent review of the Offences 
Against the Person Act, the Law Commission of England 
and Wales found generally that the statute was ‘outdated’ and 
‘notoriously difficult to understand and use’, noting that it relies 
on ‘archaic and obscure’ language and that its offences are poorly 
defined and incoherently classified (Law Commission, 2015).
The Offences Against the Person Act creates two specific 





(section 58)  and supplying or procuring an instrument or 
‘poison or other noxious thing’, knowing that it is intended to 
be used to procure a miscarriage (section 59). A third, related 
offence of concealment of birth allows a woman to be charged 
where infanticide or late abortion is suspected but cannot be 
proven. Apart from some minor changes in available sentences, 
these provisions have survived largely unaltered since 1861. 
While in many countries, women are exempt from prosecution 
for inducing the miscarriage of their own pregnancies, the 
Offences Against the Person Act offences apply to the pregnant 
woman who self- induces a miscarriage as well as to a third- party 
abortionist. They draw no distinction between abortions earlier 
and later in pregnancy, thus capturing any procedure that occurs 
after implantation (six to twelve days after fertilisation). Under 
section 58, both women and third parties face the harshest 
potential penalty for abortion foreseen in any European country 
(Nebel and Hurka, 2015): life imprisonment.
The Offences Against the Person Act makes no explicit 
provision for therapeutic abortion, leaving doctors potentially 
liable for the same offence as unqualified abortionists. However, 
a creative judicial interpretation of section 58, offered in the 
case of Bourne, provided that abortion would be lawful where 
performed by a doctor in order to ‘preserve a woman’s life’, 
with this phrase interpreted broadly to include cases where a 
termination might prevent her from becoming ‘a mental or 
physical wreck’ (Bourne 1938: 619). Until October 2019, this 
highly ambiguous test remained the legal basis for the very small 
number of lawful abortions performed within Northern Ireland 
each year, where it was restrictively interpreted, particularly 
in more recent years (Women and Equalities Committee, 
2019: para 12; Chapter Five). However, Northern Irish 
abortion law was found to breach human rights norms, with 
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women recommending that fundamental reform of the law was 
necessary to render it human rights compliant (CEDAW, 2018; 
see generally Chapter Five). In July 2019, Parliament voted by 
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an overwhelming majority for the government to introduce 
regulations to implement CEDAW’s recommendations should 
the Northern Ireland Executive not be re- established by 21 
October 2019. When this date passed with no change at 
Stormont, sections 58 and 59 were repealed for Northern 
Ireland and a moratorium was introduced on any prosecutions 
under them. At the time of going to press, the government 
is consulting on how abortion services should be introduced 
and regulated within Northern Ireland.
These offences are prosecuted infrequently. In recent years, 
section 58 appears to have been charged most often in cases 
where a wanted pregnancy is lost as the result of an assault 
on a pregnant woman or following the non- consensual 
administration of abortifacients (Sheldon, 2016). However, a 
small number of prosecutions have also been brought against 
women in England who have self- induced miscarriages very 
late in their pregnancies (for example, Catt 2013), and against 
women in Northern Ireland, who terminated early pregnancies 
using pills acquired on the internet (Women and Equalities 
Committee, 2019; Chapter Five).
The Infant Life (Preservation) Act (1929) and Criminal Justice Act NI (1945)
A second statute, the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, applies 
in England and Wales. Its terms are replicated in section 25 of 
the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1945. These statutes 
prohibit the intentional destruction of ‘the life of a child capable 
of being born alive … before it has an existence independent 
of its mother’, unless this is done ‘in good faith for the purpose 
only of preserving the life of the mother’. Each statute contains 
a rebuttable presumption that capacity for life is acquired at 28 
weeks of gestation, reflecting the state of neonatal medicine in 
the 1920s. Subsequent advances mean that this presumption 
is today likely to be considered to have been rebutted, with 
viability accepted to be reached some weeks earlier (Science 




offence has been charged infrequently and then generally in the 
context of assaults against pregnant women. It overlaps with 
the offence of ‘unlawful procurement of miscarriage’ under 
section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act, offering an 
alternative charge where pregnancy has reached an advanced 
gestation. These statutes also foresee a potential sanction of 
life imprisonment. They do not apply to Scotland, where 
abortion remains an offence at common law (Gordon, 1967; 
McKnorrie, 1985).
The 2019 reform of Northern Irish abortion law did not 
include repeal of section 25 of the Criminal Justice Act. As 
such, it remains a serious criminal offence to end the life of 
child ‘capable of being born alive’.
The Abortion Act (1967)
The Abortion Act 1967 applies in England, Wales and Scotland 
but not in Northern Ireland. It exempts those who conform 
to its requirements from prosecution under the abortion 
offences described earlier. The Act is a product of the moral 
climate and clinical realities of the 1960s, when widespread 
backstreet abortions resulted in significant maternal mortality 
and morbidity (Birkett, 1939; Dickens, 1966; Lane, 1974a). 
Abortion was then a far riskier, more technically demanding, 
surgical procedure which required the skilled hand of a doctor 
and, on average, a stay of over one week in hospital (Chapter 
Three; Lane, 1974a: table D4; Lane, 1974b: table 5.1).
These clinical realities were reflected in the restrictions 
contained in the Abortion Act. The Act was intended to ensure 
‘that socially acceptable abortions should be carried out under 
the safest conditions attainable’, ‘with all proper skill and in 
hygienic conditions’ (RCN 1981: 575 and 569). It provides 
that, in order to avoid a criminal offence, three conditions must 
be met. First, two doctors must certify in good faith that an 
abortion is justified on the basis of one or more of the four 
broad grounds set out under the Act:
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 a) continuance of the pregnancy would involve greater risk 
than termination to the physical or mental health of the 
pregnant woman or existing children of her family (subject 
to a 24- week limit);
 b) termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury 
to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman;
 c) continuance of the pregnancy would involve greater 
risk than would termination to the life of the pregnant 
woman; or
 d) there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would 
suffer from ‘such physical or mental abnormalities as to be 
seriously handicapped’.
In determining whether the first two conditions are met, the 
doctors may take account of the pregnant woman’s ‘actual or 
reasonably foreseeable environment’ (section 1(2)).
Second, the abortion must be performed by a registered 
medical practitioner, meaning that a doctor must ‘accept 
responsibility’ for the procedure (RCN 1981: 569–70, 575, 
577). And, third, it must be performed on NHS or other 
approved premises, with this requirement underpinning specific 
licensing requirements on non- NHS service providers (see 
Chapter Four). Since 1990, the government has had the power 
to license a broader ‘class of places’ – such as GPs’ surgeries or 
women’s homes – for the performance of abortions performed 
using medicines rather than surgery (see Chapter Three). In an 
emergency situation, the requirements for two signatures and 
for an abortion to be performed in NHS or approved premises 
do not apply (section 1(4)).
The Abortion Act also affords healthcare professionals a 
statutory right of ‘conscientious objection’, whereby they can 
refuse to participate in treatment authorised under the Act 
(section 4). Further, it requires the notification of all abortions 
certified and performed, underpinning the publication of 
detailed annual abortion statistics (section 2). The Abortion 
Act does not make any provision for informed consent, 
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counselling or safeguarding. Nor does it offer protection from 
intimidation or harassment of those accessing services, with the 
Court of Appeal having recently recognised that such conduct 
can cause ‘significant emotional and psychological damage’ to 
some (Dulgheriu 2019).
In sum, UK abortion law is very old. It is characterised by 
unclear and archaic language, overlapping offences and harsh 
sentences. The relevant offences are very rarely prosecuted. 
While the Abortion Act was intended to ensure that abortions 
were performed by appropriately skilled professionals in 
hygienic conditions, it was passed at a time of very different 
clinical realities and social mores. Further, the basis for 
important protections of those who access services are to be 
found not within this framework but in general provisions of 
law (see Chapter Four).
We now turn to consider how abortion services have 
developed within this legal framework. How do abortion rates 
within the UK compare to those in other western nations? 
And how have they changed over time?
Reproductive and sexual health in the UK
Since the Abortion Act came into effect, abortion has become 
an increasingly widely accepted part of life (see Chapter Two). 
One in three women in the UK has an abortion in her lifetime 
and roughly one in five pregnancies end in abortion (Wellings 
et al, 2013). Around 200,000 abortions a year take place in 
England and Wales, with another 13,000 in Scotland. Roughly 
5 per cent of the total are on non- resident women, although in 
recent years the vast majority of these have travelled from either 
the Republic of Ireland or Northern Ireland (DHSC, 2019a), 
meaning that this proportion is likely to decrease significantly 
in light of the recent liberalisation of the law in each of those 
places. Both the numbers of abortions carried out and rates 
per 1,000 women of reproductive age have fluctuated over 
time. Routinely collected statistics showed a sharp increase in 
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the reported abortion rate following the 1967 Abortion Act, 
which made it a criminal offence not to report abortions. As a 
result, for the first time, reliable statistics were available on the 
number of abortions carried out in Britain. What the official 
statistics showed unequivocally was the marked fall after the 
1967 Act in infections and mortality resulting from illegal 
abortions (see Chapter Three).
The rate of increase in reported abortions slowed from 
the early 1970s and actually fell from 1991 to 1995, possibly 
reflecting a more conservative attitude towards sexual behaviour 
generally in the era of widespread fear of AIDS and HIV 
transmission. Since the mid- 1990s the abortion rate has been 
relatively stable in England and Wales (Figure 1.1), though 
there has been a very recent hike in the figures. In every 1,000 
resident women of reproductive age, 17.4 had an abortion in 
2018 compared with 16.7 in 2017, taking the rate back to 
its level in 2008 (DHSC, 2019a). Rates for Scotland remain 
Figure 1.1: Age standardised abortion rate per 1,000 women aged  

















lower, while also hitting a ten year high in 2018, at 12.9 per 
1,000 women (ISD, 2019).
Within the overall trends there are marked age differences 
(Figure 1.2). The abortion rate is highest among 20 to 24 year- 
olds and has changed less in this age group over the last decade, 
while rates among younger women have fallen year on year. 
The under- 18 rate in 2018 of 8.1 per 1,000 women was less 
than half the 2008 rate of 18.9 per 1,000. Conversely, rates have 
been increasing among older women. The rate for women aged 
35 and over was 9.2 per 1,000 in 2018, compared with 6.7 in 
2008 (DHSC, 2019a). These same broad trends are visible in 
Scotland (ISD, 2019).
The majority of abortions are certified under the statutory 
ground of risk of harm to the mental or physical health 
of the pregnant woman. Only 2 per cent are the result of 
doctors deciding that there was a substantial risk that if the 
child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental 
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped. Of abortions in 
England and Wales, 71 per cent were medically as opposed 
Figure 1.2: Abortion rate per 1,000 women by age, England and 










All ages Under 16 16–17 18–19
2008 2018
20–24 25–29 30–34 35 or over
Source: DHSC (2019a).
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to surgically induced in 2018, an increase on the 2017 figure 
of 66 per cent and almost double the proportion in 2008 (37 
per cent). In Scotland, the figure was even higher: 86.1 per 
cent of abortions reported in 2018 were performed using 
medicines (ISD, 2019). An increasingly large proportion of 
abortions take place in the first trimester, with nine out of 
ten abortions carried out under 13 weeks. Since the advent 
of medical abortion, higher proportions of procedures have 
been carried out very early in the pregnancy: four out of five 
abortions were carried out under 10 weeks in 2018 (DHSC, 
2019a; ISD, 2019). Contrary to the impression given in some 
media reports, late abortions are rare. Fewer than 2 per cent 
happen after 20 weeks, and these tend to be for particularly 
serious reasons (Nevill, 2017).
The abortion rate can be seen as an indicator of reproductive 
health. Strategic options for preventing unintended pregnancy 
occupy a continuum. At the start of the reproductive process 
they include methods of preventing ovulation by, for example, 
use of combined hormonal contraception. Where an egg has 
already been released, use of barrier methods of contraception 
and hormonal methods aimed at creating a hostile environment 
for the male sperm will prevent fertilisation. In the event that 
fertilisation has occurred, use of emergency contraception can 
prevent implantation. Finally, where an unintended pregnancy 
is already underway, medical or surgical methods of abortion 
can be used to end it. The earlier in this process that measures 
can be taken to prevent an unintended pregnancy, the better 
for the woman involved, the lower the costs to the NHS, and 
the lesser the scope for controversy. Any increase in abortion 
rates may reflect an unmet need for contraception.
Yet changes in the rates need also to be seen against the 
backcloth of recent demographic and social trends in Britain. 
There has been a progressive decrease over the past half century 
in age at onset of sexual activity, from a median of 20 for 
women born in the 1950s to a median of 16 for those born 
after 1990 (Wellings et al, 2013), and a parallel increase in the 
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average age at which childbearing begins, from 23 years in 
1967 to 28.8 years in 2018 (ONS, 2019c). During the interval 
between these events, now averaging almost a decade and a half, 
women are single (defined as neither married nor cohabiting), 
sexually active and not wanting to conceive. The trend towards 
smaller families and the consequent need to space births and 
avoid further pregnancies following completion of childbearing 
has further led to an appreciable extension of the period during 
which women are potentially at risk of unintended pregnancy. 
Taking the average age of sexual initiation, 16 years, as the 
starting point and age 49 as the reproductive end- point, women 
now spend some 30 years of their lives avoiding unwanted 
pregnancy (ONS, 2019c).
Given these trends, it is surprising perhaps that the abortion 
rate in recent decades has remained relatively stable. In many 
respects, Britain can boast of being a success story in terms 
of national reproductive health and this is in large part due 
to contraception provision being free of charge under the 
NHS. While over half of pregnancies in Britain are planned, 
roughly one in six pregnancies are unplanned, and between a 
quarter and a third are categorised as ambivalent (Wellings et al, 
2013). However, estimates from other high- income countries 
are higher. In France and the US, a third of pregnancies are 
estimated to be unplanned, two in five in Spain, and almost half 
in Japan (Wellings et al, 2013). Considerable success has also 
been achieved in relation to teenage conception. Conception 
rates for women aged under 18 years in England and Wales 
hit a record low in 2017 – declining by 60 per cent from 49.8 
per 1,000 women in 1998 to 17.9 per 1,000 in 2017 (ONS, 
2019a), the lowest rate recorded since comparable statistics 
were first produced in 1969. The fall in under 18 conceptions 
can be attributed to an increased time spent in education, 
investment in contraceptive services leading to improved 
uptake of reliable contraception, a change in social norms 
governing early motherhood, and investment in preventive 
programmes by successive governments, notably the Teenage 
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Pregnancy Strategy for England, 1999– 2000 (ONS, 2016; 
Wellings et al, 2016).
Although most would probably consider abortion to be 
the least desirable of preventive options, sexual health policy 
in Britain supports its provision as part of the repertoire of 
strategies to reduce unintended births. Almost all abortions 
in Scotland, England and Wales are funded by the NHS. 
Whereas in Scotland, almost all are provided within the NHS, 
in England and Wales, the majority – 72 per cent – take place 
in the independent sector. Recognition that abortion provision 
is a key plank of reproductive health service provision in 
Britain has been reflected in successive policy documents (DH, 
2013; PHE, 2015). Though not always escaping controversy, 
such guidance accepts the critical role of legal abortion in 
protecting the health and wellbeing of women who conceive 
unintentionally.
How might decriminalisation of abortion come about in the UK and 
what would it look like?
Full or partial decriminalisation of abortion in the UK would 
recognise the important role that abortion has come to play 
in reproductive health policy. It would require reform of some 
or all of the laws described earlier, passed by the relevant 
Parliament. In the case of England and Wales, this would be 
Westminster. For Scotland, abortion is a devolved matter so any 
reform is a matter for Holyrood. Abortion is also a devolved 
issue in Northern Ireland so, similarly, it would generally fall 
to Stormont to legislate. However, as noted earlier in the 
chapter, with the Northern Irish Assembly suspended since 
early 2017 and abortion law in Northern Ireland found to 
breach human rights norms, the UK Parliament recently voted 
to decriminalise abortion in Northern Ireland (see further 
Chapter Five).
The fact that decriminalisation necessarily requires a process 




shape a new law in whichever way they see fit (and this will 
also be true for Stormont, if and when an Executive is re- 
established). Important issues to be considered in this process 
include whether:
• to decriminalise abortion throughout pregnancy or just 
within certain gestational limits;
• to introduce specific new offences to prohibit non- 
consensual abortion; to revise existing offences that might 
do this work; or whether existing criminal law offences of 
assault and poisoning already offer sufficient protection (see 
Chapter Four);
• to retain specific statutory provision for conscientious 
objection and, if so, whether to include a statutory duty to 
ensure that women’s timely access to services is not thereby 
impeded;
• to retain notification requirements;
• to make statutory provision for ‘safe zones’ around clinics, as 
has been done in some Australian jurisdictions, rather than 
leaving it to individual local authorities to apply for Public 
Space Protection Orders (Dulgheriu 2019).
One possible model of reform was foreseen in a Ten Minute 
Rule Bill, proposed by a cross- party group of MPs led by Diana 
Johnson (Abortion Bill 2017– 19, HC Bill 276). This foresaw 
the repeal of sections 58– 60 of the Offences Against the Person 
Act and the replacement of the existing abortion offences with 
two new offences that prohibited non- consensual abortion and 
abortion after 24 weeks. It retained provision for notification 
of abortions and protection for conscientious objection 
rights. Northern Ireland, where criminal prohibitions have 
been repealed, offers another model that might be extended 
elsewhere in the UK. Still other possibilities are offered by a 
number of Australian states that have recently decriminalised 
abortion, often removing offences modelled on those of UK 
law, and by Canada (see Chapter Six).
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Content of the book
The rest of this book sets out the evidence that should inform 
debate regarding the repeal of specific criminal prohibitions 
against abortion. First, it explores the extent to which UK 
public opinion supports decriminalisation through a close 
analysis of available polling data (Chapter Two). It then moves 
on to assess the likely consequences for women’s health of 
removing the legal restrictions imposed under the current 
criminal law framework (Chapter Three). This is followed by a 
legal analysis of whether decriminalisation is liable to result in a 
dangerous deregulation of services (Chapter Four). Given that 
the law there has evolved along different lines, Northern Ireland 
is treated separately, with Chapter Five exploring the impact of 
previous criminal abortion laws and the likely effects of their 
removal in the region. Finally, Chapter Six considers how the 
experience of other countries can inform our understanding 
of the potential consequences of decriminalisation of abortion, 
with a particular focus on two case studies that are frequently 
discussed in decriminalisation debates: Canada and Australia.
 
